I. INTRODUCTION
Modern control theory has become a useful tool in both engineering and management science. It made possible manned landings on the moon by finding trajectories with dramatically reduced fuel requirements. It has made possible significant efficiency gains in production scheduling and inventory control.
It has become the basic tool used to describe individual and firm behavior when economic activity takes place over time. The question that naturally arises is, can control theory be used to improve the performance of a market economy?
Many if not most in the profession believe the answer to this question is yes.
There have been numerous studies which have demonstrated convincingly that econometric models can be more effectively controlled through its use.'
Currently, Kalchbrenner and Tinsley (1975) , staff members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, are applying optimal control techniques to the design of macro stabilization policy. They are using a simplified version of the Fed-MIT model, which reflects the econometric tradition at its best and was designed specifically for policy evaluation.
Ill fd,
for Some time, control theory has been used in an informal waq in actual policy selection. Policymakers have looked at the current state of tile economy and used an implicit law of motion to evaluate the consequences of alternative decisions upon output, employment, and prices. Given that control theory is being used for policy selection, it is surely better that it be applied in a formal way using what is generally considered to bc the brst econometric model for policy evaluation, as Kalchbrenncr and Tinsley advocate, than in the informal way it has and is being used. Friedman (1953) has sounded a note of caution. He has argued that economctricians are a long way from having a detailed and tested theory that predicts the timing and magnitude of the effects of monetary policy and that.
until they do. fine tuning should not be attempted. He argues that thr best efforts of the Federal Reserve System have had the perverse effect of contributing to economic instability, and that a neutral policy of a constant growth in the money supply rules is preferable to the use of macro models and control theory methods.
A more fundamental attack upon the LW of macro models and control theory to stabilize the economy is due to Lucas (1 976). Hc argues that the structure of the econometric model describing the motion of the economy is not invariant to the policy rule. and that policy simulations using the major macro models are worthless in assessing alternative policy rules. He advocates the use of economic theory to predict the operatin, 0 characteristics of the economy under alternative policy rules and the selection of a rule which yields the best operating characteristics.
In commenting on Lucas's essay, Gordon (1976) has suggested that if changes in policy change the law of motion (i.e.. structure of the econometric model) in a predictable way, then control theory can still be used. One need only take into consideration such changes in designing policy. Kydland and I (1977) attempt to do precisely that and find it logically impossible. Even in dynamic deterministic situations, the optimal policy is inconsistent. Unlike games against nature. the optimal plan in subsequent periods is not the continuation of the first period optimal plan over the reniainder of the planning horizon. If one accepts the rational expectations equilibrium paradigm, optimal control is inappropriate for policy selection. (2) xt+l = F(xt+dt.
et).
Given a policy rule (here assumed deterministic, but randomized strategies are also possible) which specifies the values of the control as a function of the state variable,
and relation (2), the determination of the equilibrium decision rules of the private agents is. like all competitive equilibrium analyses, a fixed point problem.
If the structure of preference is recursive, these rules will be time invariant and of the form:
The 6, corresponds to the behavioral equations of econometric models, but are indexed by the policy rule. Equations (2), (3), and (4) define the system's law of motion under policy rule ?T. The policy design problem is to find a policy 71 which yields desirable operating characteristics for the economy.
In his critique of current econometric policy evaluation, Lucas (1976) advocates this approach.
In commenting on this critique, Gordon (1976) suggests that, if changes in the policy rule change the behavioral equations in a predictable way, then control theory can still be used, provided the controller takes into consideration these induced changes. As noted above, Kydland and I (1977) attempted to do just that and found it logically impossible. The best action, given the current situation and a correct evaluation of both current outcomes and the end of period position, is not optimal.
In a dynamic situation, the policymaker (actually, his economic advisers) If, on the other hand, the argument is that the operating characteristics of the economy may be superior for some rule other than the -constant money supply rule, then there is no disagreement.
Let w be the log of the nominal wage, and assume it is set efficiently given the policy rule.
w maximizes the expected utility of the representative worker, given he is committed to supply all the labor the firm wants at that wage. The assumed log of labor demand n is (5) n=770-771 (w-p)+ e, 6See Fischer (1977) , Modigliani (1977) , Phelps and Taylor (1977), and Taylor (1976) .
where e is an aggregate demand or supply shock and has mean zero, and where p is the log of the price level. Letting u(. , .) be the appropriate objective function for the individual, and E the expectations operator, the w selected is the one which maximizes (6) Ep n[u(w-P.n)l, subject to (5). It is further assumed that the objective function can be approximated by the quadratic function: Differentiating with respect to w, setting the resulting expression equal to zero, and solving for w, the nominal wage selected is (9) w = pe + (7) o -~1-/421)1)/77] Without knowledge of the way in which policy will be selected, there is no basis for forming price expectations.
Control theory or discretionary solution
With this solution, the rate of inflation that will be selected can be said to be best relative to some social objective function s(n,p), given w, the labor demand function Substituting this into (9), and then solving for w, yields the rational expectations nominal wage for the control theory policy.
Best policy rule
The control theory policy is not in general best. It is not optimal because the policymaker fails to take into consideration the effect of his policy rule -upon the selected nominal wage w. There will exist a policy rule of the form (13) The government finances its expenditures and past debt obligations through a proportional tax on labor income and the issuance of real purchasing power bills which come due the next period. Letting dt be the debt coming due in period t, rt the proportional tax rate, and at the price of a real bill coming due next period, the government's budget constraint is
The policy instruments are the tax rate and the amount of the bills issued. The above constraint precludes their independent manipulation, so there is but one instrument, which will be taken to be the tax rate.
For simplicity, it is assumed that the gt are independent draws from some known distribution with a finite second moment. It is further assumed that financing policy in period t depends only upon debt coming due in that period and on government expenditures; that is, rt = r(gt,dt), and dt+l = d(gt,dt).
Given these assumptions, the state variables, or position of the economy, are the pair (gt,dt).
The perfect substitutability assumption of ct for ct+l (assuming no corner solutions) implies that equilibrium ut must be 0. For the assumed production function, the demand for labor is infinitely elastic at real wage 1.
Further, the competitive assumption along with constant returns to scale implies zero profits and dividends, so share ownership need not be considered.
The competitive fixed point equilibrium problem is to determine for a given policy rule rt = r(gt,dt) the equilibrium labor employment function nt = n,(gt,dt). The employment function nr is subscripted by r because it will change as a result of changes in the policy function r(gt,df).
Equating the ratio of the marginal utility of ct and the disutility of labor supplied to the ratio of their prices, one obtains
Labor employed in period t is a decreasing linear function of the tax rate in that period. Tax receipts are rtnt, and from (20), (21), and the result that ut = /3, the equilibrium law of motion is obtained:
Because of the very special assumption, expectations of future policies do not affect current labor supply. This is why the equilibrium employment and consumption functions.
l-/J1
do not depend upon the financing policy rule followed. Nonetheless, policy is relevant, as the expected discounted value of utility flows for the representative household depends upon the policy rule followed. The answer is that this is an optimal taxation problem and welfare depends on the efficiency of taxation. By maintaining a relatively constant tax rate, and by running deficits when gt is large and surpluses when it is small, there is less welfare loss associated with financing a given stream of government expenditures.
Having access to capital markets replaces the constraints that government expenditures gt equal tax receipts rtnt for every t, with the single constraint that the present value of tax revenues equals the present value of expenditures. It is the same gain realized in static situations when the only constraint is that total receipts equal total expenditures, rather than matching expenditures types to revenue sources and then insisting upon an equality of expenditures and receipts for each match.
An interesting feature of this model is that the representative household's welfare would increase if the government defaulted on its existing debt and then followed a given debt policy promising to honor future debt obligations. Such a policy is implied by optimal control. The inconsistency problem of the optimal solution is that next period the government will again fail to honor existing debt. The control solution, then, is never to honor existing debt and, as a result, the government will not have access to capital markets. The result is inefficient taxation and a dead-weight loss to society. 
VI. TESTING THE ALTERNATIVE PARADIGMS

